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INTRODUCTION 
ule 25 of the 1912 Equity Rules stated that “it shall be sufficient 
that a bill in equity shall contain . . . a short and simple statement 
of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any 
mere statement of evidence.”  Not mere conclusions, not evidence, 
but “ultimate facts.”  And, at that, not facts “constituting the cause of 
action.” 
The bare words of Rule 25 could mean something quite different to 
a twenty-first-century audience than they meant to a twentieth-century 
audience.  But they may serve as a foil to the challenge framed by the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal2 for the committees that advise the Judicial Conference, and 
thence the Court, on the Court’s discharge of its responsibilities under 
the Rules Enabling Act.3  In those cases, the Court relied on an 
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”  Any response to the challenge of drafting a 
pleading must begin by determining whether there is any reason to 
respond at all by recommending revisions of Rule 8(a)(2) or any other 
Rule of Civil Procedure.  The Court did not suggest any reason to 
reconsider Rule 8(a)(2).  But the deluge of academic commentary 
stimulated by the Court’s opinions reflects deep concern that the 
Court has set lower courts on a path that will lead to improvident 
dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  Professor Arthur R. Miller’s article, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,4 is a masterful expression of these concerns.5 
This Article is framed as an appreciation of Professor Miller’s 
direct excoriation of Twombly and Iqbal and his straight-on assertion 
that something must be done to reset pleading standards, whether by 
the Court itself with the advice of its advisory committees or by 
 
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2075 (2006). 
4 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010). 
5 One illustration of this article’s influence can be found in Judge Hamilton’s dissent in 
McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL 4975644, at *23 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 
2011). 
R
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Congress.  His article is a massive demonstration of the qualities that 
put him at the front of civil procedure scholarship.  By no means is it 
an exercise in nostalgia for the simpler world that greeted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure on their birth in 1938.6  Nor does he mince 
words.  Professor Miller sees Twombly and Iqbal, together, as part of 
a steady march toward “efficient” disposition by sacrificing the merits 
to avoid trial and as a retreat from protecting individual rights in favor 
of concentrated wealth.7  He evokes action by the rules committees to 
restore the power of civil procedure to protect individual rights and 
enforce broad public policies.8 
If the Rules Advisory Committee embraces Professor Miller’s 
concerns, the challenge will be to draft rules that restore, directly or 
indirectly, the opportunities that “notice pleading” afforded before 
May 21, 2007, the date of the Twombly decision.9  It is also possible, 
on the other hand, that the Court got it right, and that lower courts 
have wisely developed the opportunities opened by the Court.  
Pleading standards have continued to evolve in practice in ways that 
may restore greater uniformity, at lower thresholds, than resulted in 
 
6 “Much . . . has changed in the world of litigation . . . .  The cultures of the law and of 
the legal profession are far different. . . .  And litigation in the federal courts has become a 
world unimagined in 1938 . . . .  The pretrial process has become so elaborate . . . that it 
often seems to have fallen into the hands of some systemic Sorcerer’s Apprentice. . . .  
Sadly, in some respects today’s civil litigation is neither civil nor litigation as previously 
known.”  Miller, supra note 4, at 7–9. 
7 The decisions “should be seen as the latest steps in a long-term trend that has favored 
increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of 
abusive and meritless lawsuits.  It also marks a continued retreat from the principles of 
citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in 
favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth.”  Id. at 10. 
8 The divide between plaintiffs and defendants on pleading standards “even may imperil 
the credibility and effectiveness of the rulemaking process as rulemakers try to chart a path 
from this point.”  Id. at 16.  “[T]he Federal Rules—indeed, federal civil practice in 
general—stand at a critical crossroads.  It is incumbent upon the courts and rulemakers to 
consider the full range of important questions and policy choices that have surfaced not 
just in Twombly and Iqbal, but as a result of the overarching trend toward pretrial 
disposition.”  Id. at 17.  Professor Miller throws down the gauntlet in a clear challenge to 
the Advisory Committee: “Considering the Court’s current ideological makeup and the 
continuing trend toward increasingly early case disposition, rulemaking by judicial 
mandate does not bode well for many of those policies that are furthered by private 
enforcement and the access principle.  The members of the Advisory Committee therefore 
must determine whether they will reassert their role as independent architects of the 
Federal Rules, accept that an aspect of their responsibility now may be to codify the 
Court’s Federal Rule decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case development.”  
Id. at 87. 
9 That is the approach of proposed legislation, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
described infra note 57. 
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the early years as hundreds of district court judges sought to work 
through the uncertainties opened by the Court’s opinions.  The 
steadying perspective of appellate judges can balance the initial 
enthusiasm of some trial judges for practices that free time for 
obviously substantial cases by sacrificing cases that seem 
insubstantial.  If courts come to get it right, the challenge will be to 
decide whether there is any occasion to amend the rules at all, and if 
so whether Rule 8(a)(2) should be amended—perhaps along lines 
similar to Equity Rule 25—to better express the new approach.  For 
that matter, it is possible that, constrained by unchanged rule 
language, the Court, as understood by the lower courts, did not go far 
enough.  Drafting still more demanding pleading standards would be 
a drafting challenge of a different order. 
No purpose would be served by adding to the countless summaries 
of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions that grace the law reviews and 
court reports.  Anyone reading these comments is thoroughly familiar 
with them.  Professor Miller’s article provides a comprehensive 
account of the cases and commentary over the first three years and 
more following Twombly, and more than a year following Iqbal.  
What follows is a series of reflections on the responsibility of the 
rules committees to consider all major gradations of pleading 
standards and possible direct ties of discovery to pleading 
requirements.  Committee work in all things is deliberate.  Apart from 
the most obvious technical changes, it takes at least three years to 
move from an idea to an adopted amendment.  More important or 
difficult topics take longer, often much longer.  And even the starting 
point may be deferred when, as with pleading, practice continues to 
develop and painstaking empirical work is progressing.  Illustrations 
are drawn from ongoing Advisory Committee work, with two 
cautions.  The illustrations are only that, pictures drawn from a larger 
body of Committee materials.  And none has been the subject of the 
intense Committee deliberations that will occur if—it is not certainly 
“when”—the Committee concludes the time has come to work on 
specific proposals.  Nothing in what follows can be taken as even a 
hint of possible Committee recommendations. 
The principal themes are easily summarized.  The Twombly and 
Iqbal opinions reveal the Court’s hope that something good may be 
achieved by increasing the opportunity to dismiss litigation at the 
pleading stage.  The opinions do not give any precise guidance toward 
realizing the hope.  Instead, they have encouraged lower courts to 
engage in a common-law process that, by fits and starts, is working 
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toward new practices.  Litigants have presented many motions that 
speed the evolutionary process, but evolution continues.  When some 
measure of stability is achieved, it will remain to be determined what 
to make of it all.  That determination will not be easy.  Counting the 
rate and numbers of dismissals is only a beginning.  The hard part will 
be reaching judgments about the desirability of the new practices, if 
indeed the new practices become firmly established. 
The most common belief—to many, the fear—is that actions that 
would not have been dismissed on the pleadings before Twombly and 
Iqbal will be dismissed in the era of new pleading practices.  Is any 
increase undesirable?  Is it possible that a still greater increase would 
be desirable?  Judgment requires a means of valuing the loss of claims 
that would have succeeded if allowed to survive at the pleading stage, 
values that involve both individual interests and broader social 
interests in enforcing policies enshrined in substantive law.  To many 
observers, judgment also requires a means of valuing the impositions 
on defendants who must litigate beyond the pleading stage, whether 
to win on the merits or to settle on terms shaped by the uncertainty 
and costs of continued litigation.  Undertaking rules amendments 
requires a reasonably secure judgment that things have gone wrong.  
That may be some way off.  If that judgment is reached, the next task 
is to translate it into rule provisions that move practice in a better 
direction.  That may be the greatest challenge of all.  The rules 
committees may be pardoned for proceeding with self-conscious 
deliberation. 
I 
CIVIL RULES COMMITTEE AGENDA BEFORE 2007 
This account of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s 
consideration of pleading practice begins a bit more than two decades 
ago.  Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted were reconsidered as part of a 
project to revise summary judgment practice under Rule 56, a project 
that fell dormant for many years before it was revived to produce the 
rewritten rule that became effective on December 1, 2010.  There was 
some early enthusiasm for a proposal that would abolish the 12(b)(6) 
motion and also the Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
The purpose was to “unif[y] pleadings motion practice with summary 
judgment practice.”  The motion could address the legal sufficiency 
of a claim, with or without a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a legally sufficient claim.  The major difference 
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was that the nonmovant’s opportunity for discovery before a ruling, 
an established feature of summary judgment, would be expressly 
confirmed for motions that challenge only the legal sufficiency of a 
claim.10  This proposal was dropped from the Rule 56 project before 
the project was put aside for further work following rejection by the 
Judicial Conference. 
By 1993, the focus shifted from the question whether to add further 
protections against dismissal for failure to state a claim.  That was the 
year the Supreme Court decided Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit.11  The Court ruled that 
“heightened pleading” could not be required for claims that a 
municipal entity was liable for Fourth Amendment violations 
committed by its employees and was separately liable for failing to 
train its employees to avoid Fourth Amendment violations.12  The 
Court reasoned that by specifying issues that must be pleaded with 
particularity in Rules 9(b) and (c), the rules impliedly exclude any 
other particularized pleading requirements.13  At the close, the Court 
suggested that it might be that the Rules should be rewritten to subject 
claims against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “to the added 
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b).  But that is a result which must 
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by 
judicial interpretation.”14 
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee immediately took up the 
invitation to consider specific pleading requirements.15  Given the 
occasion, it should be no surprise that the Committee framed the 
question in those terms: should heightened pleading be required, 
either for specific categories of cases or in more general terms?  By 
the time of the Advisory Committee meeting in the fall of 1993, it 
 
10 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE FEBRUARY 
13–14, 1987, MEETING, at 138–44 (1987) (on file with author) (setting out the Rule 12 
proposal). 
11 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
12 Id. at 164. 
13 The opinion might seem inconsistent on this rationale, because it left open the 
possibility that “our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading 
in cases involving individual government officials.”  Id. at 166–67.  The inconsistency 
could be explained away, however, by understanding this caveat to mean only that Rule 
8(a)(2) would be satisfied by mere notice pleading but that the substantive imperative of 
official immunity supersedes ordinary pleading rules. 
14 Id. at 168. 
15 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE MAY 3–5, 1993, MEETING, 
at 17–18 (1993). 
COOPER 3/19/2012  8:11 AM 
2012] King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading 961 
framed these questions in terms that anticipated part of the debates 
that rage today. 
The memorandum that framed the questions suggested that “the 
required level of pleading specificity varies widely among different 
types of litigation.”16  It found support both in academic 
commentary17 and judicial observations.18  It did not take a position 
on this phenomenon.  It made note of the argument that “it would be 
virtually impossible for the rulemaking process to regularize the 
process by which heightened pleading requirements are enforced.”19  
On the other hand, it observed that expanding the motion for a more 
definite statement might, indeed, regularize the process; yet, “[o]ne 
range of arguments surely will be that a seemingly neutral procedure 
will in fact be used to dispose of disfavored claims by artificially 
elevated pleading requirements.”20 
After the 1993 memorandum, pleading reappeared on the Advisory 
Committee agenda at irregular intervals.  Some of the illustrative draft 
rules are included in the survey of potential amendments set out in 
Part IV.  The last appearance before the Twombly decision came in 
September 2006.  This proposal suggested a number of alternative 
ways to revise the Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement.  
Three variations would have added authority to order a more definite 
statement of a pleading—any pleading, not only “a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is required”—“if a more particular pleading 
will support informed decision of a motion under subdivisions (b), 
(c), (d), or (f)”; “will facilitate management of the action [under Rule 
16]”; or “will enable the parties and the court to conduct and manage 
discovery and to [present and] resolve dispositive motions.”21  A 
fourth variation was more direct: “[o]n motion or on its own, the court 
 
16 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE OCTOBER 21–23, 
1993, MEETING, at 196 (1993). 
17 Id. (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986)). 
18 Id. (quoting Judge Keeton, who served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure: “[S]pecificity requirements are not limited to cases decided 
under Rule 9(b) or under Admiralty Rules C(2) and E(2)(a).  Rather, the ‘degree of 
specificity with which the operative facts must be stated in the pleadings varies depending 
on the case’s context.’”  Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 866 (1st 
Cir. 1993)). 
19 Id. at 197. 
20 Id. at 198. 
21 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE SEPTEMBER 7–8, 
2006, MEETING, at 294–96 (2006). 
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may order amendment of a pleading to provide sufficient particularity 
to” achieve whichever of the three variations might be chosen.22 
Two of the illustrations of possible rules amendments may be 
noted.  Rule 8(a)(2) might be amended to require “a short and plain 
statement of the claim in sufficient detail to showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”  What has become Rule 8(d)(1) might be 
amended to read: “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and 
direct.  No technical form is required.  The pleading as a whole must 
be sufficient to support informed decision of a motion under Rules 
12(b), (c), or (f).” 
Lawyers reacted favorably.  Judges were concerned that Rule 12(e) 
would become the basis for reflexive, “roadblock” motions.23  In 
2005, the Advisory Committee summarized competing considerations 
in terms that seemed to anticipate Twombly and Iqbal: 
 The wide variety of heightened pleading requirements that have 
emerged in practice provides the foundation for a response to this 
history.  It may show that the collective wisdom of many judges, 
growing over time, is better than the abstract passion for minimized 
pleading.  Whatever may have been desirable in 1938 or 194824 is 
no longer desirable.  The burdens imposed by going to pretrial 
stages beyond pleading continue to grow.  As the law keeps 
growing to regulate more and more human activities in increasingly 
complex ways, so grows the opportunity to bring lawsuits founded 
on theories that cannot withstand the light of full statement.  
Pleading must be restored as a protection against the procedures that 
help to prepare for trial or summary disposition.25 
 
22 Id. at 297. 
23 The summary in the minutes provides greater detail: 
[T]he judges seemed to be reflecting experiences different from the experiences 
of the lawyers.  The lawyers represented careful, thoughtful, desirable practice.  
They can understand the potential good uses of case-specific pleading orders as 
means to more efficient identification of the issues, control of discovery, and 
perhaps resolution by dispositive motion.  The judges confront lawyers who do 
not practice to these standards, and fear misuses that will add to delay and 
impose burdens on the court that are not sufficiently alleviated by simply 
denying the ill-founded motions.  The many tools available to shape discovery 
and to manage an action more generally may counsel that nothing be done.  The 
idea still may deserve development, but great care will be required. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE SEPTEMBER 7–8, 2006, 
MEETING, at 24 (2006). 
24 The bill of particulars was replaced by the Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite 
statement in 1948. 
25 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE OCTOBER 27–28, 
2005, MEETING, at 390 (2005). 
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The Committee carried the Rule 12(e) project forward, but the 
Twombly and Iqbal opinions open questions that must be viewed from 
broader perspectives.  Now the Committee must consider many 
alternatives, some competing and some mutually enforcing. 
II 
THE COURT SPEAKS 
The two decades of Supreme Court pleading pronouncements 
before the Twombly opinion provided uncertain guidance.  Two 
opinions stated clearly that outside Rule 9(b), Rule 8(a)(2) provides a 
uniform standard that prohibits heightened pleading.26  At least three 
others, and perhaps four, seemed to apply standards more demanding 
than elemental “notice” pleading.27 
 
26 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
27 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416–18 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council 
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).  The Crawford-El opinion is the most explicit.  It 
mingled two concerns: pleading a claim that “requires proof of wrongful motive” against a 
public officer who may be able to invoke official immunity.  Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 
597.  By ordering the plaintiff to reply to the answer, or by ordering a more definite 
statement under Rule 12(e), “the court may insist that the plaintiff ‘put forward specific, 
nonconclusory factual allegations’ that establish improper motive causing cognizable 
injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment. . . .  
This option exists even if the official chooses not to plead the affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity.”  Id. at 598. 
 In the Associated General Contractors case the Court assumed that the antitrust laws 
might be violated by an agreement among construction contractors to coerce others to do 
business with nonunion firms, weakening and restraining the trade of other firms.  
Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 527–28.  The Court added a footnote that may 
be more interesting because the author was Justice Stevens, who dissented in Twombly: 
Had the District Court required the Union to describe the nature of the alleged 
coercion with particularity before ruling on the motion to dismiss, it might well 
have been evident that no violation of law had been alleged.  In making the 
contrary assumption for purposes of our decision, we are perhaps stretching the 
rule of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 . . . too far.  Certainly in a case of 
this magnitude, a district court must retain the power to insist upon some 
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy 
to proceed. 
Id. at 528 n.17 (ordering dismissal for want of antitrust standing). 
 The Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346–48 (2005), ruled 
that a complaint for securities fraud “failed adequately to allege” proximate cause and 
economic loss.  The Court invoked a passage from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957), that was quoted and preserved in the Twombly opinion: the “short and plain 
statement” required by Rule 8(a)(2) “must provide the defendant with ‘fair notice of what 
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”  Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 
346.  But the complaint failed because it alleged only that the plaintiff bought stock at a 
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Lower courts were similarly inconsistent.  In 2004, Judge Posner 
wrote that the Federal Rules replaced fact pleading with notice 
pleading, forbidding any heightened pleading requirement that a 
prisoner plaintiff “plead enough facts to show that it would be 
worthwhile to put the defendants to the bother of answering the 
complaint . . . [despite] the frivolousness of most of that [prisoner] 
litigation.”28  Other opinions, on the other hand, clearly required 
exquisitely detailed pleading.29 
Then came Twombly, followed two years later by Iqbal.  The Court 
seemed concerned that the time had come to reorder the multiple 
approaches reflected in its own opinions and the welter of approaches 
taken in the lower courts.  It is easy to explain away each case by 
pointing to the special reasons that could have led the Court to want 
to protect the defendants at the pleading stage.  The concern in 
Twombly was that it is easy to allege a horizontal conspiracy among 
 
price inflated by the defendants’ misrepresentations.  Id. at 347–48.  Paying an artificially 
inflated price is not, the Court thought, “a relevant economic loss.”  Id. at 347.  The 
complaint did not provide “notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what 
the causal connection might be between that loss and the misrepresentation[s].”  Id.  The 
opinion blends substantive securities-law concepts with pleading requirements in a way 
that defeats confident characterization, but it would be easy to conclude that it required a 
heightened level of “notice” in response to the perceived needs of a particular class of 
litigation. 
28 Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970–71 (7th Cir. 2004). 
29 Two wrenching examples illustrate this.  First, the court in Rivera v. Rhode Island, 
402 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005), affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging a substantive due 
process violation based on a state-created risk.  A murder suspect killed the plaintiff’s 
fifteen-year-old daughter after she agreed to appear as a witness against him.  Id. at 30.  
The complaint set out facts to support the theory that the defendants created the risk: they 
persuaded the girl to be a witness, assured her she would be protected, compelled her to 
confront the defendant in open court, failed to put her in a witness-protection program 
although another child witness was placed in a program, and failed to react after repeated 
notices of repeated explicit threats made to the child.  Id.  The court assumed that a claim 
would be made if “the circumstances shock the conscience,” id. at 36, but found the 
pleading inadequate, id. at 39.  The most obvious explanation is that the court was intent 
on severely limiting the state-created risk theory.  It seems likely that many other courts 
would have reached the same decision. 
 Second, the court in Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2005), affirmed dismissal of 
a complaint brought on behalf of a mentally challenged eight-year-old boy who was 
repeatedly sodomized and sexually molested by other residents of a state-run residential 
facility where the state had placed him after he fell victim to sexual abuse by his father.  
“Because of John’s youth, limited cognitive abilities, and his emotional trauma from the 
attacks, he is unable to provide details of the events or identify how the Defendants’ 
actions allowed the attacks to occur.”  Id. at 988.  After rejecting dismissal on the basis of 
heightened-pleading requirements, the court affirmed dismissal for failure to satisfy the 
trial court’s “reasonable orders to delineate Defendants and identify their respective acts or 
omissions.”  Id. at 989. 
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competitors or potential competitors, but it is difficult to prove 
conspiracy either as a matter of explicit agreement or as a matter of 
elusive concepts that seek to distinguish “conspiracy” from achieving 
the same behavior by sophisticated calculation of move and possible 
countermove in a concentrated market structure.  The concern in 
Iqbal was that the ease of alleging intent to discriminate was 
supplemented by the manifest wish, reflected in official immunity 
doctrine, to protect high-ranking public officials against the burdens 
of litigation.  But both in Twombly and in Iqbal the Court did not 
restrict its opinions to those concerns.  Instead, it wrote in general 
terms about the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2). 
The Court’s explicit focus on the costs imposed by contemporary 
discovery practices demonstrates the broad reach of both opinions.  
The Court showed clear skepticism about the ability of trial court 
judges to contain these costs by carefully managing discovery in a 
process designed to elicit, at reasonable cost, information sufficient to 
support a determination whether to end the case on a dispositive 
motion or to advance to full-blown discovery.  Repeated failure to 
curtail runaway discovery costs, even if only in a small fraction of 
cases at the top of the extensive discovery scale, suggested that the 
time had come to explore reliance on pleadings motions as an 
enhanced threshold for admission to the discovery process. 
The opinions the Court wrote to express this concern are not 
models of clarity.  Understandably, in construing present Rule 8(a)(2) 
the Court did not attempt to draft new rule text.  Many terms might 
characterize the Twombly opinion in this dimension.  Not all are 
flattering, but a sympathetic characterization is both possible and at 
least close to the mark.  The Court’s vantage point at the top of the 
federal court structure lends a perspective not always given to those 
laboring in the trenches.  It is easy to become accustomed to the 
incredibly expensive discovery practiced in some cases, assuming it is 
warranted by a deliberate choice to depend on discovery, not “notice” 
pleadings, to determine what facts are available to support application 
of a legal theory that is valid if, indeed, facts can be found to support 
its application.  The Court is not immersed in this practice on a daily 
basis.  It is easier for it to ask whether something can be done to 
redress the balance, at least some of the time for some of the cases. 
The Twombly opinion provides a rich smorgasbord of phrases that 
courts may seize upon to support any of a wide range of pleading 
regimes.  They might require substantially heightened pleading across 
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the board, or nearly so.30  Or they might apply different pleading 
standards to different categories of actions.  Or, in the phrase from 
Iqbal, they might apply ad hoc pleading standards, even within any 
particular category of actions according to “judicial experience and 
common sense.”31 
It would be easy to emerge from studying the Twombly opinion 
uncertain, or even bewildered, as to what is intended.  Uncertainty 
seems the appropriate sense of it.  But it is the Court’s own 
uncertainty.  Hoping that something might be done through initial 
evaluations at the pleading stage to advance the Rule 1 goals of “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination,” the Court does not know just 
what that something might be.  Rather than attempt a firm answer, it 
has invited the lower courts to carry on, more openly and more freely 
than in the past, a common-law process of developing pleading 
standards.  This uncertainty, perhaps mixed with some ambivalence, 
may be found in later opinions that seem to honor the pre-Twombly 
“no heightened pleading” admonitions.32 
The lower courts have responded to the invitation.  Initial reactions 
diverged markedly, as might be expected.  Five years is not yet 
enough time to achieve stability, not even stability in settling on 
different approaches in different circuits.  But there is reason to think 
that the process of sorting things out is proceeding at a sensible rate.  
Certainly the courts have, from the beginning, devoted great energy 
and care to the task.33  And some, after only a few years, have 
 
30 The Twombly opinion said in a footnote that what then was the Form 9 complaint for 
negligence, now Form 11, suffices.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 
(2007).  There was little choice; Rule 84 says that the forms suffice under these rules.  But 
as noted in Part IV, the sufficiency of pleading negligence in an automobile accident does 
not control the sufficiency of pleading negligence in other contexts. 
31 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
32 Pride of place is commonly given to Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), 
decided two weeks after Twombly, reversing on the certiorari papers the dismissal of a pro 
se prisoner’s complaint.  The Court invoked its own earlier statements that a pro se 
complaint is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal 
pleadings drafted by lawyers.  Id. at 2200. 
 In Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), the Court cited the Swierkeiwicz decision, 
see supra note 26 and accompanying text, and went on, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . generally 
requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an 
exposition of his legal argument,” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1246. 
33 Judge Newman’s opinion in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub 
nom. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, is a remarkable illustration of resourceful, sympathetic, and 
understanding response within barely more than three weeks of the Twombly opinion.  He 
found that the opinion, through “several, not entirely consistent signals,” indicated an 
intent “to make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had prevailed in 
the federal courts ever since Conley v. Gibson.”  Id. at 155.  The “conflicting signals 
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concluded that no more than modest changes have been made.34  Of 
course disagreements of expression remain and often reflect real 
 
create some uncertainty as to the intended scope of the Court’s decision.”  Id. at 157.  
“[T]he Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is 
instead requiring a flexible ‘plausibility’ standard, which obliges a pleader to amplify a 
claim with some allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render 
the claim plausible.”  Id. at 157–58. 
34 The Seventh Circuit has provided many good opinions.  Four, and a dissent in a fifth, 
chosen almost at random, illustrate the point. 
 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), was, like Iqbal, an action against a 
cabinet member.  The plaintiffs claimed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was 
personally involved in and responsible for their unlawful imprisonment and torture in Iraq.  
Id. at 594.  But unlike Iqbal, they did not need to allege a purpose to discriminate.  See id.  
The court found adequately pleaded facts to support claims “that Secretary Rumsfeld acted 
deliberately in authorizing interrogation techniques that amount to torture,” and also 
“deliberate indifference . . . in failing to act to stop the torture of these detainees despite 
actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse.”  Id. at 600.  The complaint spread over 79 
pages and 387 paragraphs.  Id. at 595.  The rules “impose no special pleading requirements 
for Bivens claims, including those against former high-ranking government officials.”  Id. 
at 600.  The court rejected such arguments for the defendant as that allegations of 
imprisonment in “extremely cold” cells lacked factual context, elaboration, or 
comparisons, invoking the simplicity of Forms 10-15 mandated as sufficient by Rule 84.  
Id. at 607. 
 In In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010), the court 
began by explaining its decision to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal.  There 
was “a question of the meaning of a common law doctrine—namely the federal common 
law doctrine of pleading in complex cases.”  Id. at 626.  “Pleading standards in federal 
litigation are in ferment after Twombly and Iqbal,” justifying permission to appeal.  Id. at 
627.  In Iqbal, the Court said that the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability 
requirement but demands more than a sheer possibility.  Id. at 629. 
This is a little unclear because plausibility, probability, and possibility overlap.    
. . .  [W]hat is plausible has a moderately high likelihood of occurring.  The fact 
that the allegations undergirding a claim could be true is no longer enough to 
save a complaint from being dismissed; the complaint must establish a 
nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid; but the probability need not be 
as great as such terms as “preponderance of the evidence” connote. 
Id. 
 Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), was a claim for injury caused by 
a hip replacement device manufactured in violation of federal law.  In ruling that the 
original complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court 
quoted an earlier opinion: “As a general rule . . . notice pleading remains the standard.”  
Id. at 559 (quoting Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 
536 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2008)).  And another: “We give the plaintiff ‘the benefit of 
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.’”  Id. (quoting 
Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009)).  The plaintiff 
need not plead the precise defect or the specific federal regulatory requirements that were 
allegedly violated.  Id. at 560.  “[T]he victim of a genuinely defective product . . . may not 
be able to determine without discovery and further investigation whether the problem is a 
design problem or a manufacturing problem.”  Id.  Making matters more difficult at the 
pleading stage, much of the critical information is confidential as a matter of federal law.  
Id.  “An injured plaintiff cannot gain access to that information without discovery.”  Id. 
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 Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010), was a divided decision.  
Dismissal of a complaint alleging race discrimination in denial of a home-equity loan was 
reversed.  Id. at 407.  Explaining Twombly and Iqbal, Judge Wood wrote for the majority, 
As we understand it, the Court is saying . . . that the plaintiff must give enough 
details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.  
In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did 
they happen.  For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up 
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff’s 
inferences seem more compelling than the opposing inferences. 
Id. at 404.  And the court’s reliance on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), 
“indicates that in many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a 
plaintiff to meet [the pleading] burden than it was before the Court’s recent decisions.”  
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.  Judge Posner dissented, emphasizing the burdens of discovery, 
particularly when a plaintiff has little information to be discovered and can impose heavy 
discovery burdens on a defendant who has extensive information.  Id. at 411.  Twombly 
and Iqbal were intended to create a greater symmetry of litigation costs.  Id. at 412.  But 
“[i]f the plaintiff shows that he can’t conduct an even minimally adequate investigation 
without limited discovery, the judge presumably can allow that discovery, meanwhile 
deferring ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”  Id. 
 Judge Hamilton wrote the court’s opinion in Vance v. Rumsfeld, described above, and a 
dissent in McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL 4975644 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 
2011).  In McCauley, the plaintiff’s decedent was killed by her former boyfriend.  Id. at 
*1.  The claim was that the City of Chicago violated her equal protection rights by failing 
to protect domestic violence victims.  Id. at *6.  The court saw the claim as a “policy-or-
practice claim” of failing to have adequate policies in place.  The court invoked Twombly 
and Iqbal to establish the need for some specific facts: “The degree of specificity required 
is not easily quantified . . . .  The required level of factual specificity rises with the 
complexity of the claim.”  Id. at *4 (citations omitted).  The claim here was both complex 
and “counterintuitive.”  Id. at *7.  Allegations that the city “authorized, tolerated, and 
institutionalized the practices and ratified the illegal conduct,” “with deliberate, callous, 
and conscious indifference,” were mere “legal elements, . . . not factual allegations and as 
such contribute nothing to the plausibility analysis . . . .”  Id. at *6.  The remaining 
allegations failed to rise to the level needed to support what the court found to be 
required—“selective withdrawal of police protection.”  Id. 
 Judge Hamilton’s dissent shared skepticism that the plaintiff could establish the required 
showing that the police department made a deliberate decision to withdraw protection for 
victims of domestic violence because of an intentional animus against women.  Id. at *8.  
But, he said, the claim is legally viable.  Id.  According to Judge Hamilton, the case thus 
presented the problem of faithfully honoring all the commitments a lower court has in 
developing federal pleading doctrine.  Id. at *10.  The court must “do [its] best to apply the 
law as stated in Iqbal.”  Id. 
[But] it [is] also our responsibility to do our best to apply other Supreme Court 
decisions involving pleading standards . . . as well as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . and the form pleadings that are part of the Federal Rules . . . .  
Iqbal is in serious tension with these other decisions, rules, and forms, and the 
Court’s opinion fails to grapple with or resolve that tension.  I do not believe it is 
an exaggeration to say that these decisions, rules, and forms simply conflict with 
Iqbal. 
Id.  In other words, the Court’s interpretation of Rule 9(b), allowing general allegations of 
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind, conflicts with the Rule. 
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differences in approach.35  Differences existed before the Supreme 
Court spoke and will remain no matter how often and clearly the 
Court may speak again.  For that matter, differences will persist even 
if the Civil Rules Advisory Committee attempts to regularize pleading 
standards, or the relationship between pleading and discovery, by 
amending the Civil Rules. 
III 
MEASURING THE EFFECTS 
Several sophisticated empirical attempts have been made to assess 
the effects of Twombly and Iqbal by measuring the frequency and 
outcome of motions to dismiss on the pleadings.  The broadest study 
was undertaken by Joe Cecil at the Federal Judicial Center at the 
request of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.36  This study also 
 
 The full Iqbal opinion conflicts with other Supreme Court opinions.  It conflicts with the 
form complaints.  “Unless one can plausibly explain away the tension[s] . . . then Iqbal 
conflicts with the Rules Enabling Act . . . and the prescribed process for amending the 
Federal Rules . . . .”  Id. at *12.  Beyond these flaws, “the fact/conclusion dichotomy is 
highly subjective,” “leading to judge-specific and case-specific differences in outcome that 
confuse everyone involved.”  Id.  By invoking “‘judicial experience and common sense,’ 
[Iqbal] invites the highly subjective and inconsistent results that have been observed.”  Id. 
at *13.  Applying Twombly and Iqbal could easily have led to dismissing the complaint in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Dismissal in this case ran afoul of the 
Court’s no-heightened-pleading rulings, Rule 9(b), and the form complaints.  “Perhaps the 
Supreme Court majority intended Iqbal to work such a revolution in federal civil practice, 
but if so, the Court failed to grapple with the conflicts and did not express any direct 
rejection of these other governing sources of law.”  McCauley, 2011 WL 4975644, at *17. 
35 A perceptive and careful review, covering more than the first four years after 
Twombly, is provided by Andrea Kuperman, Review of Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (July 26, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts 
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_072610.pdf. 
36 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf 
/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS]; JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 
12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (2011), available at http://www.fjc 
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf [hereinafter CECIL ET 
AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION].  The November report indicates that revisions will be 
made to account for data missed in the original work, but also finds “no reason to believe 
that inclusion of the missing orders will change the findings of our study of outcomes of 
motions.”  CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION, supra, at 1. 
 The FJC study is appraised in Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An 
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss (Oct. 27, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1904134.  Dr. Cecil and Professor Hoffman discussed the issues raised by Professor 
Hoffman at the November 7–8, 2011, meeting of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.  
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summarizes some of the other studies.37  The FJC study counted Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss filed in the first ninety days after an 
action was filed during two periods: October 2005 through June 2006, 
and October 2009 through June 2010.38  Twenty-three federal 
districts were included, accounting for fifty-one percent of all federal 
civil cases filed during these periods.39  Some types of cases were 
excluded.40  Motions based on insufficient pleading of the facts were 
not distinguished from motions based on inadequacy of legal 
theory.41  Nor was it possible to take account of possible changes in 
pleading practices to include more factual allegations.42 
The FJC studies are too rich in detail to adequately summarize 
here.  The broadest finding, made without adjustments, was that in all 
cases (excluding prisoner and pro se cases), the rate of filing a motion 
to dismiss went from 4.0% in 2005–2006 to 6.2% in 2009–2010.43  
This is characterized as a 2.2% difference; it also could be described 
as a 55.0% increase in the rate of filing.  Different rates were found 
for different categories of cases.44  Statistical adjustments 
complicated the picture but confirmed increases in the rate of making 
motions.45 
Rulings on the motions came next.  The broad findings were that in 
all cases counted, motions were denied in 34.1% of the cases in 2006, 
and 25.0% in 2010.46  Some or all of the relief requested by the 
motion was granted in 65.9% of the 2006 cases and 75.0% of the 
2010 cases, but there was a change in the frequency of granting with 
leave to amend.47  From 2006 to 2010 grants with leave to amend 
increased from 20.9% to 35.3%, while grants without leave to amend 
fell from 45.0% to 39.7%.48  These figures were then subjected to 
 
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE NOVEMBER 7–8, 2011, 
MEETING, at 473–77 (2011). 
37 CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS, supra note 36, at 1 n.4. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 See id. at 5–6. 
42 See id. 
43 Id. at 8. 
44 Id. at 8–9. 
45 Id. at 21. 
46 Id. at 14 tbl.4. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  The purpose of the November study was to determine what happens after a 
motion is granted with leave to amend.  “Our conclusions remain the same.”  CECIL ET 
AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 1. 
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statistical adjustments to account for differences between the two 
periods in the courts in which motions were filed (different courts 
have quite different grant rates), the types of cases, and the presence 
of an amended complaint (courts are more likely to grant without 
leave to amend if the complaint has already been amended).  After 
adjustments, a statistically significant increase in the grant rate was 
found only for financial instrument cases.49  “No statistically 
significant increase in the likelihood that motions would be granted 
was found for other types of cases.”50 
The central findings naturally lead many readers to conclude that 
more actions are being dismissed for failure to state a claim.  What 
else could follow from an increase in the frequency of motions 
coupled with an unchanged rate of grants?  Differences in the data 
bases used, however, leave the FJC researchers agnostic on that score.  
At the same time, the other studies they note suggest that in fact more 
cases are being dismissed for failure to state a claim in the aftermath 
of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. 
What may be made of this research and the many projects that are 
sure to follow? 
First, it seems clear that in deciding whether to file an action, a 
plaintiff must recognize an increased probability of facing a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  That is likely to increase cost and 
delay.  Some plaintiffs may abandon the enterprise for that reason 
alone without regard to any calculation about the prospects of 
prevailing on the motion after Twombly and Iqbal. 
Second, it seems likely that more cases will be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim.  Quite apart from empirical counting of 
motions and outcomes, increased dismissals seem likely unless lower 
courts completely reject any heightened pleading standards or—by 
some heroic calculation—potential plaintiffs manage to avoid filing 
any of the actions that would not have been dismissed under earlier 
notice pleading standards but would be dismissed now. 
Third, as often observed, it is not possible to determine by docket 
studies how many plaintiffs are deterred from filing actions by 
counting the outcomes in cases that are filed.  It seems safe to assume 
that one consequence of heightened pleading is that, with or without 
more careful prefiling investigation and preparation, some plaintiffs 
abandon litigation before it is even commenced.  Survey research 
 
49 CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS, supra note 36, at 21. 
50 Id. at 19. 
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seeking subjective experience may provide some insight on this 
possibility, but those who are displeased with the results will 
complain that the results are no more than an accumulation of 
anecdotes told by interested participants. 
Fourth, there is no compelling indication that plaintiffs have 
become victims of wholesale pleading slaughter. 
Fifth, measuring long-term effects will require long-term patience.  
It will be difficult to determine the point at which lower courts have 
achieved as much convergence on stable pleading standards as will 
occur without further outside influences.  Lawyer practices are likely 
to stabilize only after that, as plaintiffs adjust the level of prefiling 
investigation and the amount of detail packed into complaints and 
defendants adjust the frequency of challenges to complaints.  Many 
lawyers practiced heightened pleading long before Twombly and 
Iqbal; as more lawyers take up some measure of heightened pleading, 
and learn to sort cases better before filing, the measurable events will 
shift—so will the events that survey research seeks.  And changes in 
the surrounding institutional framework will make measurement still 
more difficult.  Overall case loads, changes in the mix of actions, 
gradual turnover in the ranks of federal judges, variations in pleading 
standards and practice influenced by local state-court practices, and 
countless other factors will generate some static. 
Alas, accepting all of the studies and whatever conclusions they 
may support does not much advance the inquiry.  It is important, 
indeed very important, to do such work as the FJC has done and as 
others are doing.  But counting outcomes does not evaluate outcomes.  
The Supreme Court seems to believe that it may be a good thing to 
dismiss at the pleading stage more actions than were being dismissed.  
If the Court is right, it is a good thing to dismiss more actions and to 
discourage filing actions that should be dismissed.  And how do we 
measure that?  If the selection process is not perfect, how could it be?  
How do we balance the increased dismissal of claims that do not 
deserve dismissal against the increased dismissal of claims that do 
deserve dismissal? 
It may seem obvious, but the first step is to decide on the criterion 
for deserved dismissal.  Because pleading is a procedural matter, it is 
fair to accept substantive law as a given.51  It might be argued that 
 
51 There is room to suspect that occasionally a dismissal on the pleadings reflects a fear 
that, absent dismissal, a claim will succeed on the merits of law that is distasteful to the 
court.  That does not seem a valid purpose for any procedural device. 
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dismissal is desirable whenever the claim would lose on the merits of 
established law in a perfect procedural system.  If that protects against 
an unwarranted victory on the merits in our imperfect procedural 
system, so much the better.  That measure seems somehow wrong.  
What is a procedural imperfection depends on the values of the 
beholder.  A jury’s ability to decide in defiance of the law is a 
common illustration that may account for the occasional muttered 
admonitions that enhanced pleading standards may violate the 
Seventh Amendment.52  For want of anything more complex, then, let 
us accept success on the merits in our actual court system as the 
measure.  Justice is denied by dismissal of the complaint in an action 
that, if pursued to judgment on the merits, would result in judgment 
for the plaintiff. 
One side of the balance, then, is the cost of dismissing a claim that, 
if allowed past the pleading threshold, would succeed on the merits.  
Defeat of a right to recover is easily seen as denial of a right, and 
rights must be taken seriously.  But it would be extravagant to argue 
that a heightened pleading standard must be rejected if it results in the 
mistaken dismissal of even a single valid claim—a right—no matter 
how great the marginal success in dismissing invalid claims. 
Perhaps the importance of defeating meritless claims at the 
threshold deserves some elaboration.  Serious burdens are imposed on 
a defendant by the simple act of commencing an action.  Ordinarily 
we do not compensate the successful defendant even for the out-of-
pocket costs, much less the distraction from ordinary affairs and the 
emotional upheaval.  These costs have grown as discovery has grown.  
The Court’s concern with discovery costs is not idle.  These costs 
should not be disregarded on the simple theory that generally 
defendants are business enterprises, insured, or individually wealthy 
enough to make suing them worthwhile.  Even government 
defendants deserve concern, despite their ability to spread the costs of 
pursuing justice to the citizens at large.  Not all plaintiffs are wronged 
innocents, nor are all defendants wrongdoers. 
 
52 A nice illustration is provided by Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, 
Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 399, 403 (2011): Twombly and Iqbal “are an implicit attack on the jury trial and, in 
turn, on our democracy.”  “[T]he cases put the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial . . . 
in jeopardy.”  Id. at 405. 
 A much more detailed argument is provided by Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to 
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008). 
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These arguments point toward evaluating the ratio between valid 
and invalid claims in the bundle of increased dismissals that result 
from elevated pleading standards.  If many invalid claims are 
dismissed at the cost of dismissing no more than a few valid claims, 
higher pleading standards may well be desirable.  But the trick is to 
guess at the ratio, and guesses are likely the best we can do.  
Empirical evaluation of even a few thousand cases by this measure, 
chosen in an attempt to match across courts and categories of cases, 
before and after Twombly and Iqbal, seems impossible.  Even 
recruiting neutral and sufficiently wise evaluators, and cross-checking 
their evaluations, could be an insurmountable challenge.  Guessing is 
about as good as can be hoped for, and dispassionate guessing will be 
hard to come by. 
If empirical evaluation indeed falls short, inquiry may turn to 
features of pleading standards that may invite questionable dismissals.  
The Twombly and Iqbal opinions provide tempting targets.  
“Plausibility” lies in the eye of the beholder.  Mere possibility is not 
enough.  But the inference of liability need not be more probable than 
all others, nor indeed as probable as the most probable competing 
inference.53  And, at least according to the Court in Twombly, there is 
no need to show a probability that the plaintiff can actually prove 
well-pleaded facts.54  The Court in Iqbal, on the other hand, attributes 
to Twombly a test requiring “factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
 
53 A different rule is applied in cases governed by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, which requires that a claim of securities fraud “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).  The Court has ruled that because “[t]he strength of an 
inference cannot be decided in a vacuum,” “[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a 
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling 
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323, 324 (2007).  Tellabs was decided one month 
after Twombly. 
54 Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability 
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.  
And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 
judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and “that a recovery is 
very remote and unlikely.” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal repeats the rule that all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), but the malleability of the “well-pleaded” test leaves 
manifest opportunities to disregard asserted “facts” as mere “conclusions.” 
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misconduct alleged.”55  These words should be read to mean only that 
the judge can find that a reasonable inference might be drawn, not 
that the judge must actually find the inference “reasonable” in some 
higher sense.  But what sense is to be made of all this and the many 
other opaque statements?  The line between legal conclusions and 
factual allegations also is not as clear as the Court may have it.  The 
bare allegation of negligence in Form 11 suffices, at least for now, but 
it expresses a legal conclusion based on applying a standard of care to 
unpleaded facts.  Reliance on “judicial experience and common 
sense” strikes many as an invitation to indulge the predispositions of 
individual judges.  And if not that, at least too easy an excuse for 
clearing the docket of suspect cases to free judicial capacities for 
other cases that, somehow, seem more deserving. 
Another concern, frequently voiced, is that detailed pleading of fact 
elements cannot be demanded when the defendant controls access to 
the information needed to state the facts.  This concern with 
“asymmetric information” cases is reflected in Rule 11(b)(3), which 
allows pleading of factual contentions that “will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery.”  It seems untoward to dismiss without 
allowing some opportunity for discovery when the defendant alone 
knows facts crucial to the claim.56 
 
55 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
56 But an opinion in the Sixth Circuit reads Iqbal as compelling this result.  New Albany 
Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046 (6th Cir. 2011).  The court affirmed 
dismissal of a price-discrimination complaint for failure to plead facts that would support 
an “indirect-purchaser” claim that the defendant manufacturer controlled the prices 
charged by its exclusive distributor, the plaintiff’s sole source of supply.  Id. at 1048.  The 
court recognized that the defendants “are apparently the only entities with the information” 
required.  Id. at 1050.  “Before Twombly and Iqbal, courts would probably have allowed 
this case to proceed so that plaintiff could conduct discovery in order to gather the pricing 
information that is solely retained within the accounting system of” the defendants.  Id. at 
1051. 
[But] the language of Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be 
conducted in cases such as this, even when the information needed . . . is solely 
within the purview of the defendant or a third party, as it is here. . . .  By 
foreclosing discovery . . . the combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal require 
plaintiff to have greater knowledge now of factual details in order to draft a 
“plausible complaint.” 
Id.  The court cited Professor Miller’s article, perhaps showing the risk that protests about 
potential misreadings may become self-fulfilling.  Id.  At any rate, the court made too 
much of this sentence in Iqbal: “Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, 
he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”  Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1954).  This sentence appears at the end of a segment that emphasizes the need to 
implement the protections against litigation afforded by official immunity.  Iqbal, 129 S. 
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How these concerns play out in practice remains the central 
question.  Feckless dismissals are possible.  Sophisticated and 
restrained application of higher pleading standards also is possible.  
Assessment of the outcome is likely to remain impressionistic, and to 
be available only after still some years more of lower court 
developments. 
IV 
THE RULEMAKING CHALLENGE 
Put aside the challenge of measuring the actual impact of Twombly 
and Iqbal, now or in the future, in manifold different categories of 
cases.  And put aside the challenge of assessing the impact, now or in 
the future, whether good, bad, or neutral.  Different challenges 
confront the rulemaking process if it is concluded that the changes are 
good, bad because they cause too many dismissals, bad because they 
do not yet achieve enough dismissals, or neutral because in the end 
the lower courts batter the law back to where it pretty much was 
before the Court spoke. 
Take first what may be the simplest conclusion, that the lower 
courts, working the magic of the common-law process, achieve a 
good or neutral balance across the board.  Is there any point in 
attempting to capture the new standards in revised Rule language?  
Often it is valuable to capture established “best practices” in rule 
language, making them uniform.  Ideal rule language would clearly 
express the present best practice, but leave room for cautious 
continuing evolution as circumstances continue to change.  The 
drafting is not always easy.  Possible illustrations are provided below. 
It seems fair to assert that by far the largest portion of current 
academic commentary believes that pleading standards have been 
raised too high, at least some of the time for some types of cases.  
Certainly Professor Miller holds this fear.  If that is right, the drafting 
task will be to find language that cuts back, either to some lower 
pleading level that remains above the pre-Twombly practice or to the 
practice that existed when Twombly was decided.  Some of the bills 
 
Ct. at 1953–54.  Repeating the Court’s skepticism about the ability of trial judges to 
supervise carefully focused discovery, the Court said this in the preceding sentence: “[W]e 
are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level 
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of 
their duties.”  Id. at 1954.  The admonition against discovery should be limited to this 
context.  For that matter, there is a difference between not being “entitled” to discovery 
and having access to discovery in the court’s discretion. 
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aimed at superseding the Court’s new venture into pleading standards 
expressly attempted to restore pleading practices to the state of the 
world on the day before Twombly was decided.57  At least two 
difficulties must be surmounted in taking this approach.  The first is 
that pleading standards varied both within the Supreme Court’s own 
opinions and in lower court application.  All that could be restored 
would be an attitude and, perhaps, a process of continuing evolution 
of the sort that actually led to Twombly and Iqbal.  The second is 
similar.  Lower courts interpreting a rule crafted to restore the pre-
Twombly world would understand that the Supreme Court would 
provide the authoritative interpretation of the new rule.  If the Court 
had adopted the new rule in the regular course of the Enabling Act, 
bowing to a considered recommendation that pleading standards had 
been raised too high, its interpretation would no doubt choose words 
different from those used in Twombly and Iqbal.  But the Court could 
easily choose from the more demanding precedents, diminishing the 
new rule’s effect.  And if the new rule was adopted by direct 
congressional intervention, the Court might interpret it more 
grudgingly still. 
Responses to the concern that pleading standards have been raised 
too high can be made indirectly, without revising any of the pleading 
rules.  The most obvious alternatives would address the problem of 
asymmetrical information by providing some form of discovery in aid 
of pleading.  Possible models are described below. 
As yet there are few suggestions that lower courts have not gone as 
far as should be in raising pleading standards, whether as measured by 
the Court’s wishes in Twombly and Iqbal or as measured by a more 
pressing need for reform than the Court recognized.  But it is 
important to hold open all possible diagnoses of developing practice.  
Any attempt to raise pleading standards would stir vigorous 
resistance.  The resistance would be in large part political in a true 
sense, advancing the public and private needs to ensure effective 
enforcement of the social and regulatory policies embodied in the 
 
57 An example is the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. § 
3(a) (2010): “Except as expressly provided by an Act of Congress enacted before, on, or 
after the date of enactment of this Act . . . or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure effective on or after that date, the law governing a dismissal, striking, or 
judgment described under subsection (b) shall be in accordance with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in decisions 
issued before May 20, 2007.”  Subsection (b) described “dismissal or striking of all or any 
part of a pleading containing a claim for failure to state a claim, indefiniteness, or 
insufficiency, or a judgment on the pleadings.” 
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laws that might be under-enforced.  Careful drafting would do little to 
appease the resistance—if anything, clearly heightened standards 
could augment resistance.  The drafting options could focus on Rule 
8, seeking generally higher standards but perhaps allowing a few 
exceptions for categories of claims to be governed by more relaxed 
standards.  Or the particular pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) might 
be expanded, either by adding to the categories listed in Rule 9(b) or 
by adopting a new multipart rule listing a lengthy catalogue of claims 
(and perhaps defenses).  Singling out particular substantive categories 
for heightened pleading would require detailed and sensitive 
substantive knowledge.  And arguments would be made that 
distinctions among claims are inappropriate, either as a general matter 
of “transsubstantivity” or as a departure from the command that 
Enabling Act “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”58 
Before turning to a sample of drafting approaches, the example of 
Form 11 bears repeating.  Form 11—Form 9 before the Style 
Project—is a complaint for negligence.  The operative parts are 
simple: “on date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor 
vehicle against the plaintiff.  As a result, the plaintiff was physically 
injured . . . .”  The acts constituting negligence are nowhere 
described.  Causation is pleaded casually: “as a result.”  A footnote in 
the Twombly opinion seems to find this form sufficient, observing that 
“[a] defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact pattern 
laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer . . . .”59  The cogency 
of Form 11 rests not only on simplicity.  Familiarity is also important.  
Motor vehicle accidents are frequently litigated.  The parties know 
exactly how to go about preparing the case.  They can focus discovery 
with little difficulty, and if they do not the court should have little 
difficulty doing it for them. 
But what if a Form 11 complaint involves a more complicated legal 
claim?  What if the accident occurs in a no-fault state: should the 
plaintiff be required to plead facts that take the plaintiff out of the no-
fault regime and into negligence liability?  Or what if the claim is 
against the vehicle’s manufacturer: does it suffice to allege generally 
that the design was unreasonably unsafe (negligent)?  Suppose the 
claim is that the manufacturer had sufficient notice of similar events 
to create a reasonable-care duty to launch a recall campaign?  Or, 
 
58 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
59 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
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shifting arenas, the claim is for negligent misrepresentations: could it 
suffice to allege only that at a specified time and place the defendant 
made negligent misrepresentations that the plaintiff relied upon to his 
injury?  Or, to take a truly bold claim, how much need be alleged to 
go forward with a claim that the SEC was negligent in failing to 
uncover and stop a massive Ponzi scheme?60  The idea that a few 
words in a pleading rule can cover all negligence claims with 
precision, dispensing with any need for elaboration in application, is 
doomed to fail.  Multiplying this simple example across the full range 
of claims that may be brought to a federal court shows the need for 
flexible generality in the pleading rules.  At some point, the rules will 
have to rely on wise application in response to specific cases, 
whatever the risks of invoking “judicial experience and common 
sense.” 
What follows is, pretty much without change, material that was 
included in the agenda materials for the April 4–5, 2011, meeting of 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.61  The aim was to list some of 
the more obvious alternatives, whether broad avenues or narrow 
paths.  The rule language used to illustrate some of the alternatives is 
only that—illustration that gives a clearer focus for inquiry, not 
carefully refined drafting. 
The controlling caution must be repeated.  None of these sketches 
reflects Committee deliberation, much less choice.  They are heuristic 
in purpose, prepared to remind the Committee of choices that may be 
plausible, however far below the threshold of probable. 
A.  Pleading: Claim 
An obvious place to begin is with Rule 8(a)(2).  Even if some need 
appears to propose rule amendments, Rule 8 must be approached 
carefully.  No matter what words might be chosen, the message would 
be ambiguous in ways that a committee note could not cure.  Even if 
it were announced that the new language was intended to enshrine 
exactly the meaning of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions as elaborated 
by the lower courts, disputes would remain as to just what that 
meaning might be.  If instead the purpose were to redirect in some 
way the paths taken by the lower courts, greater uncertainty—and 
 
60 This was the claim in Molchatsky v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2510 (2d Cir. June 21, 2011). 
61 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE APRIL 4–5, 2011, 
MEETING, at 173–80 (2011). 
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likely some real confusion—would follow.  The manifest 
vulnerabilities of almost any Rule 8 proposal would support cogent 
protests by any group that feared adverse effects, and there might be 
many such groups.  Still, Rule 8 must hold a high place on any agenda 
for addressing pleading standards. 
Restore What Never Was: Some of the reactions to the Twombly 
decision seem to ask for restoration of the dictum in Conley v. Gibson 
that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state claim only if “it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”  The plea for 
restoration in turn seems to ask that these words be taken literally.  
Most courts, at least, did not take the literal meaning.  But Rule 8 
might be redrafted in an attempt to restore a standard that never was: 
“a short and plain statement giving notice of the claim.” 
Restore What Was: A more realistic approach might attempt to 
restore pleading practice as it was on May 20, 2007, the day before 
the Twombly decision.  This approach is more realistic only if it is 
accepted that there can be no precise definition of the practice in place 
at the time Twombly was decided.  The idea would be to “go back to 
doing whatever it was you were doing, and continue to develop 
pleading practice without regard to anything in the Twombly or Iqbal 
decisions that might point you in a different direction.”  Even then it 
is difficult to believe that lower courts, recalling the Twombly and 
Iqbal opinions, could in fact recreate whatever they would have done 
had those cases never gone to the Supreme Court.  But the attempt 
could be made.  Two simple drafting possibilities are: 
“a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader 
is may be entitled to relief.” 
“a short and plain statement of the claim—regardless of its 
nonconclusory plausibility—showing . . . .”  Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 859 n.135 (2010). 
A less reverent approach might be to republish present Rule 
8(a)(2), with a committee note disavowing plausibility, context, 
judicial experience, and common sense.  Explaining that it was 
messy, all those things counted, but it doesn’t do to say so. 
“Notice plus”: The ABA Section of Litigation paper, “Civil 
Procedure in the 21st Century: Some Proposals” (April 24, 2010), 
proposes this as a mid-ground between their perception of Twombly-
Iqbal standards and the notice pleading practice that prevailed on May 
20, 2007: 
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“A complaint shall allege facts based on knowledge or on 
information and belief that, along with reasonable inferences from 
those factual allegations, taken as true, set forth the elements 
necessary to sustain recovery.” 
Twombly–Iqbal in Rule Speak: Another approach would reflect 
basic agreement that the time had come to raise pleading standards to 
some extent—that the Court was right to make the attempt and also 
right to express the new approach in capacious language leaving the 
way open for lower court improvisation on the way to hammering out 
new standards through a common-law process.  Although the 
opinions are written as opinions, not in an attempt to mimic rule 
language, some of the key words could be absorbed into Rule 8.  
These are among the possibilities: 
“a short and plain statement showing a plausible claim for relief” 
“a short and plain statement of facts and context showing the 
pleader is entitled to relief” 
“a statement of non-conclusional facts, direct or inferential, 
showing the pleader is entitled to relief” 
“a short and plain non-conclusory statement showing the pleader is 
entitled to relief” 
“a short and plain statement of a transaction or occurrence showing 
. . .”62 
“a short and plain statement of acts or events showing . . . ” 
“a short and plain non-conclusory statement of grounds sufficient to 
provide notice of (a) the claim and (b) the relief sought”63 
“a short and plain statement, made with particularity, of all material 
facts known to the pleading party that support the claim creating a 
reasonable inference that the pleader is plausibly entitled to relief,” 
defining “material fact” as “one that is necessary to the claim and 
without which it could not be supported.”64 
  
 
62 An early draft of Rule 8(a)(2) required a “statement of the acts and occurrences upon 
which the plaintiff bases his claim or claims for relief.”  Without “showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief,” this would be quite relaxed. 
63 This is the proposal of the New York State Bar Association Special Committee on 
Pleading Standards in Federal Litigation.  Letter from Samuel F. Abernethy, Esq., to The 
Honorable Mark R. Kravitz (July 13, 2010) (on file with author).  Bringing “notice” into 
rule text is evocative, perhaps too evocative—it may imply a more general relaxation of 
pleading standards than actually existed before Twombly and Iqbal. 
64 This is the proposal of Lawyers for Civil Justice, DRI, the Federation of Defense & 
Corporate Counsel, and the International Association of Defense Counsel. 
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More than Twombly–Iqbal: 
“The party that bears the burden of proof with respect to any claim 
or affirmative defense must plead with particularity all material 
facts that are known to that party that support that claim or 
affirmative defense and each remedy sought, including any known 
monetary damages.  A material fact is one that is essential to the 
claim or defense and without which it could not be supported.  As to 
facts that are pleaded on information and belief, the pleading party 
must set forth in detail the basis for the information and belief.”65 
Variations on Facts: Although the label is likely to prove 
controversial, Rule 8 could be pushed in the direction of something 
that could be called “fact pleading.”  The second of the three 
variations shown here approaches Code pleading; the first and third 
are designed to make it easier to disclaim any intent to revive 
indeterminate distinctions between “fact,” “ultimate fact,” and 
“evidence.” 
“a short and plain statement of facts showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief” 
“a short and plain statement of facts constituting the claim” 
“a short and plain statement of the claim, including facts showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief” 
Elements Pleading: Occasionally it is suggested that a pleader 
should be required to plead the elements of the claim: “a short and 
plain statement of the elements of the claim.” 
Prefiling Pleading: Alan Morrison’s Duke Conference paper 
proposes an approach to situations in which the defendant has control 
of fact information required to state a claim.66  Iqbal as would-be 
plaintiff, for example, could submit a letter or draft complaint to the 
defendants alleging that they ordered the challenged practices.  If the 
defendants do not supply information in their control showing how 
the policies were established, they would be barred from challenging 
the complaint for failure to allege specifically facts connecting them 
to the orders.  A mere blanket denial would not do, because there is 
likely to be a paper or e-mail trail. But if the defendants present 
 
65 INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (IAALS), 
21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: PILOT PROJECT 
RULES, 3 (2009) (Rule 2.1). 
66 See Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil 
Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993 (2012).  An earlier version of this article was 
presented at the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School, May 10–11, 
2010. 
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evidence countering the claims, then the plaintiff must present “some 
basis . . . to avoid dismissal, rather like a mini summary judgment.” 
Reverse Pleading Burdens: Professor Miller suggests that if the 
plaintiff alleges the inaccessibility of critical information and 
“articulates a reasonable basis for the information’s existence and the 
defendant’s control over it . . . it might be reasonable to reverse the 
pleading burden and require the defendant to make the needed 
material available to the plaintiff along with whatever explanation it 
thinks appropriate.”67  The court could allow further discovery.68 
Appellate Review: Professor Miller asks whether the “subjective 
appraisals” that inhere in “judicial experience and common sense” 
will lead to diluted appellate review.69  Need the rules be amended to 
ensure continued de novo review of dismissals for failure to state a 
claim? 
B.  Rule 9(b) 
From time to time thought has been given to adopting “heightened 
pleading” standards for specific kinds of claims, expanding the Rule 
9(b) requirement that “fraud or mistake” be stated “with 
particularity.”  (Rule 9(c) also requires that a party denying that “a 
condition precedent has occurred or been performed . . . must do so 
with particularity.”)  One reason to hesitate has been concern that 
picking out specific claims might seem to imply substantive choices.  
Requiring greater fact information to allow a claim past the Rule 
12(b)(6) threshold into the heavenly fields of discovery might seem to 
reflect a judgment about the relative desirability of enforcing that kind 
of claim.  Although this concern must be taken seriously, there are 
powerful arguments that the purpose is as much procedural as the 
purpose of original Rule 9(b).  (The original procedural purpose of 
Rule 9(b) may not be entirely clear, but any obscurity may bolster the 
argument that some blend of real-world procedural concern with 
substantive concerns is proper under the Enabling Act.) 
Greater difficulty might arise in deciding just which claims to 
embrace in heightened pleading standards.  Broad informal 
consultation might establish a tentative list.  Actual choices for 
development might be supported by miniconferences or a general 
 
67 Miller, supra note 4, at 110. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 34–36. 
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request for public comment before any specific rule or set of rules is 
proposed. 
Implementation by drafting would be influenced by the direction 
taken.  If the revised rule simply expanded the categories of claims 
that must be stated “with particularity,” the main challenge would be 
finding a way to identify the claims.  Would it suffice to list 
“antitrust” claims, or should a more specific list of statutes be 
adopted?  Some categories might be relatively easy to specify—civil 
RICO would be an example.  But what of “environmental” claims—
statutory, common-law (e.g., nuisance), or perhaps administrative?  
“Institutional reform”?  Even the familiar example of claims likely to 
encounter an immunity defense could prove tricky; qualified or 
absolute official immunity to federal-law claims might be clear 
enough, but what of parallel immunities to state-law claims?  
Sovereign immunity, domestic or foreign?  More exotic immunities? 
Finally, a quite different Rule 9(b) question may be found in the 
Iqbal opinion.  Rule 9(b) provides that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, 
and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”  
The Court rejected the argument that this provision makes adequate a 
bare allegation of “intent.”  “‘[G]enerally’ is a relative term. . . .  It 
does not give . . . license to evade the less rigid—though still 
operative—strictures of Rule 8.”70  The task of pleading greater 
supporting detail for an allegation of intent is daunting, and is 
encountered frequently.  Discrimination claims provide a common 
example.  This question may deserve close attention.71 
C.  Reverse Rule 9(b): Special Relaxed Pleading Rules 
Rather than expand the categories of claims that must be pleaded 
with particularity, whether in Rule 9(b) or in new rules, a reverse 
approach might be taken.  Pleading standards could be raised for most 
claims, retaining relaxed notice pleading for specified claims.  
Individual discrimination (at least in employment: what of “class-of-
one” equal protection claims?), intent to discriminate, “civil rights,” 
claims based on facts inferred from circumstance, and others could be 
listed.  One problem will be finding categories that can be kept within 
 
70 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
71 Judge Hamilton’s dissent in McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL 
4975644, at *10 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2011), is more direct: “Iqbal’s reasoning and holding 
conflict with Rule 9(b) . . . .”  “The Court’s statement about Rule 9(b) that ‘“generally” is 
a relative term’ does not solve the problem or give practical guidance to district courts.”  
Id. at *11. 
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meaningful bounds—“civil rights” is a pretty loose concept.  It would 
be difficult to draft in terms that focus directly on information 
asymmetry, on “favored” claims, or “real people” claims.  It would be 
possible to adopt an express pro se rule—but that might tempt 
lawyers to suggest a limited advising role at the beginning, to be 
followed by explicit representation later on.  And past discussions 
have generally concluded that it is better to hold pro se parties to 
some semblance of the general pleading rules, perhaps with help from 
local forms and often with help from sympathetic judges. 
D.  Official Immunity 
The recurring problem of official immunity pleading is difficult to 
address by focusing on the complaint.  Perhaps the most feasible 
approach would be to require pleading with particularity whenever an 
individual-capacity claim is brought against a “public officer or 
employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission 
occurring in connection with duties performed on a public employer’s 
behalf.” 
An alternative approach would call for a reply, in the practice made 
famous by the Fifth Circuit.  The rule might be framed as a Rule 
9(b)(2), or as a Rule 7(a)(8), or something still different.  The major 
difficulty with the Rule 7(a)(8) approach might be that plaintiffs 
would often overlook it.  But it would be easy to draft if the reply is 
optional: “(8) a reply to an official immunity defense.”  If the reply is 
mandatory, there would be a cross-reference in Rule 7(a)(7), and a 
new Rule 9(b)(2): “(2) Reply to [Official] Immunity Defense.  If a 
defense of [official] immunity is made [to a claim], the claimant must 
respond by a reply that states with particularity the circumstances that 
defeat immunity.”  “Official” is placed in brackets to indicate one of 
the drafting dilemmas—what sorts of immunity should be covered?  
Should the rule be framed explicitly in terms of an individual-capacity 
claim against a public officer or employee, etc.?  “Official” itself 
would lead to such questions as Eleventh Amendment “immunity,” 
claims against foreign sovereigns, and various immunities under state 
law.  Without “official,” all sorts of questions would arise: workers’ 
compensation immunity?  Charitable immunity, if it exists anywhere?  
Family immunities, if they exist anywhere?  Even such things as 
immunity from attachment or the like? 
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E.  Rule 12(d) 
Rule 12(d) might serve better than Rule 56 as the location for a rule 
allowing a party opposing a claim to make what in effect is a 
preliminary motion for summary judgment.  The motion would rely 
on matters outside the pleadings to challenge facts poorly pleaded, 
facts omitted, and perhaps facts “well pleaded.”  The pleader would 
have an opportunity for discovery similar to that provided by Rule 56 
before responding to the motion.  A rough draft: 
(D) PRELIMINARY SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  A party [opposing a 
claim] may combine a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) 
with a preliminary motion for summary judgment under Rule 
56.  The movant may show there is no genuine dispute as to 
material facts that are required to support the claim or that 
defeat the claim.  The court must allow the non-movant a 
reasonable opportunity for discovery on the facts asserted by 
the movant before ruling on the motion. 
(It would be possible to carry forward some version of present Rule 
12(d), which gives the court the choice between treating the pleadings 
motion as one for summary judgment by undertaking to consider the 
“matters outside the pleading.”  Or discretion to refuse to allow a 
premature Rule 56 motion could be expressed directly.  The 
advantage of treating it as a Rule 56 motion is to pick up the full Rule 
56 procedure from the beginning.  Less elliptical drafting also may be 
desirable, but might encounter the reluctance to refer directly to the 
Rule 56 moving burdens that shaped new Rule 56.) 
F.  Rule 12(e) 
We might consider reviving earlier Rule 12(e) proposals.  The rule 
could focus on directing a more definite statement for the purpose of 
facilitating pretrial management, including initially limited discovery 
to support more precise pleading.  Professor Miller describes this as a 
“Motion to Particularize a Claim for Relief,” allowing a plaintiff to 
anticipate a motion to dismiss by moving for “plausibility 
discovery.”72 
G.  Rule 12(b): Tied to Discovery 
A great part of the dismay engendered by the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions arises from concerns about “information asymmetry.”  The 
concerns tend to focus on categories of claims—product liability, 
 
72 Miller, supra note 4, at 112–14. 
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some forms of employment discrimination, conspiracy, and so on.  
Plaintiffs, it is argued, typically lack access to information controlled 
by defendants and necessary to satisfy higher pleading standards.  The 
need to support adequate pleading by discovery to elicit information 
controlled by the defendant might be built into Rule 12.  The 
provision could focus only on 12(b)(6).  Discovery may be needed to 
respond to other 12(b) motions, but it may be better to leave that to 
present practice.  Discovery also may be needed to respond to a 
motion under Rule 12(c) or (f).  The idea would be to allow—
probably not require—the court to permit discovery for the purpose of 
improving the pleading before ruling on the motion. 
Placing this approach in Rule 12 will prove awkward.  The 
enumeration of Rule 12(b) motions as (1) through (7) is more a list 
than a sequence of paragraphs.  The best approach might be to add a 
new subdivision after Rule 12(f)—subdivisions (g) and (h) do not 
have the same sacred identification as 12(b)(6) or even 12(c), and 
subdivision (i) was created in 2007 by the Style Project.  So a new 
Rule 12(g) might look something like this: 
“(g) Discovery in Aid of Pleading.  Before ruling on a motion under 
Rule 12(b), (c), or (f), the court may allow discovery [under Rules 
26 through 37 {and 45}] to aid [more detailed 
pleading][amendment of the pleading].” 
H.  Rule 27.1: Discovery in Aid of Pleading 
Discovery in aid of pleading might be fit into Rule 26, but Rule 26 
is already too long.  It could be fit into present Rule 27, but 
perpetuation of testimony is a distinct problem and drafting would 
likely be more complicated.  A new Rule 27.1 may be the simplest 
approach. 
The first question will be whether to provide for discovery before 
filing an action.  There are several state-law models.  In addition, the 
ACTL/IAALS Pilot Project Rules include a detailed provision, set out 
in the Appendix, that provides a helpful illustration.  The most 
persuasive reason to move in this direction may involve the plaintiff 
who does not know the identity of the defendant—which officer in a 
large police department shot the plaintiff’s decedent?  Which 
company made the exploding dynamite cap?  Discovery could be 
limited by requiring showings that the plaintiff has exhausted 
reasonable alternatives for finding the information, the plaintiff can 
state all elements of a claim apart from identifying the defendant, and 
there are good reasons to impose the burdens of discovery on the 
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person asked for the information.  This possibility has been twice 
suggested during earlier rounds of discovery work, and was quickly 
rejected each time.  It may not prove any more popular now, but 
reconsideration may be appropriate if elevated pleading requirements 
create a risk that valid claims will frequently be defeated for lack of 
access to information controlled by the defendant.  (The ABA 21st 
Century Proposals would allow pre-complaint discovery only to 
determine the identity of the defendant.) 
An alternative is to provide discovery in aid of framing a claim 
after an action is commenced by filing a complaint.  Discovery might 
be made available by allowing the plaintiff to file an incomplete 
complaint, specifically designating items on which discovery will be 
sought to support better-informed pleading.  The defendant could 
respond by providing information without waiting for discovery, by 
agreeing to discovery, or by opposing discovery for stated reasons.  
Or discovery might be provided only after a motion challenging the 
claim (or defense).  This approach comes closest to something that 
might be fit into Rule 26, perhaps with a cross-reference in Rule 12: 
the point would be to emphasize the authority to limit discovery to 
specific matters needed to support “better” pleading. 
The ABA proposals include: 
“The court may permit focused post-complaint discovery in those 
limited cases where, because of the nature of the case, the plaintiff 
does not have access to sufficient information to satisfy the” 
pleading standard. 
Examples are antitrust cases and discrimination cases where intent is 
an element of the claim. 
I.  Initial Disclosure 
Pleading and discovery may overlap in a different way.  Early 
disclosure of facts might be accomplished immediately after the 
papers that are called “pleadings,” by obligations of unilateral 
disclosure.  This approach might address the concerns that underlie 
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions by providing a secure foundation for 
guiding or eliminating discovery, while reducing fears that evaluation 
of “plausibility” in light of “judicial experience and common sense” 
will devolve into poorly supported speculation about the “facts” that 
have been pleaded and the inferences that can be drawn from them. 
The Duke Conference reflected competing views on present Rule 
26(a)(1) initial disclosures.  One view is that they are useless.  
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Another is that they are helpful.  A third is that they could become 
useful if the more searching 1993 version were restored, requiring 
disclosure of information that a party hopes will not be used as well 
as information it may use. 
J.  Pleading in Response 
It will be difficult to improve on the drafting of Rule 8(b) to meet 
the frequent complaints that defendants deny too much, too casually.  
Rule 8(b)(2) requires that a denial fairly respond to the substance of 
the allegation.  Rule 8(b)(3) requires that a party that does not intend 
to deny all allegations “must either specifically deny designated 
allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted.”  
Rule 8(b)(4) requires that a party admit the part of an allegation that is 
true and deny the rest.  If a true fact is pleaded with characterizations, 
adverbs, or adjectives, the answer must admit the fact even while 
denying the characterization, adverbs, or adjectives.  Rule 11 enforces 
this duty; indeed the safe-harbor provision, 11(c)(2), specifically 
includes defenses and denials.  The safe harbor may make it difficult 
to make much use of Rule 11 in this context, but amendment of Rule 
11 may not be a satisfactory approach. 
Defendants defend their practices by arguing that plaintiffs cause 
the problem by overpleading and by violating the separate-statement 
requirement of Rule 10(b).  In effect, they assert it is unfair to impose 
on defendants the work of picking through the mess made by sloppy 
pleading.  Again, it will be difficult to draft a satisfactory rule to 
promote clearer pleading.  Anything done to perpetuate the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions may actually make this problem more difficult. 
So: Is there anything reasonable to be done?  One comment in the 
ABA survey suggested whatever Rule 8(a) requires, good fact 
pleading could be useful as a request for admissions, and laments that 
defendants do not respond as Rule 8(b) requires.  That sounds good.  
But is it possible to get there? 
K.  Pleading Affirmative Defenses 
Plaintiffs complain that defendants thoughtlessly add long lists of 
affirmative defenses to their answers, providing nothing more than the 
words that identify the theory.  Something more could be required. 
Two examples from present Rule 8(c) illustrate the range of 
pleading possibilities.  A defendant may plead comparative 
negligence—is there any reason to require greater detail than we 
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require of a plaintiff pleading negligence?  Or a defendant may plead 
laches—should it not have to plead something to support the elements 
of unreasonable delay and actual prejudice in defending? 
The range of desirable pleading practices may not be as broad as it 
is for complaints, but it is not much narrower.  If anything is to be 
done, it may be better to avoid any attempt to provide specific 
pleading directions for specific affirmative defenses.  There are far 
too many affirmative defenses, most of them not listed in Rule 8(c). 
One illustration can invoke all of the possible variations in 
[re]drafting Rule 8(a)(2): 
“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state in 
short and plain terms any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .” 
CONCLUSION 
The sketches set out in Part IV provide an incomplete overview of 
the many questions that flow from the Twombly and Iqbal opinions.  
Measuring the height of the pleading thresholds that emerge from 
lower-court development will be challenging in itself.  No yardstick 
or thermometer exists to calibrate precise scales of pleading precision.  
Impressionistic assessments will be made, but they will vary with the 
perspectives of the assessors.  And it seems unlikely that thresholds 
will be set at the same height across the wide range of substantive 
claims that come before the federal courts.  But it remains possible to 
make rough measurements.  The most likely guess is that pleading 
thresholds will be raised, at least for many categories of actions. 
Then the hard work begins.  Raising pleading standards may be 
good, bad, or neutral.  “Bad” may mean standards that are too high or 
not yet high enough.  Any rules prescription will depend on the 
diagnosis and no diagnosis can be certain.  But certainty is not 
required in the rules business.  Serious problems demand attention, 
and get it.  Pleading problems can be addressed directly by pleading 
rules.  They also can be addressed by new modes of integrating 
pleading with opportunities for discovery.  Summary judgment also 
might be integrated more closely with pleading and discovery 
practice, facilitating access to vital sources of information while 
protecting against the burdens of full-blown discovery before an early 
determination whether the action should proceed to the stage of full 
discovery and beyond.  The Civil Rules Committee can properly take 
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up arms in response to Professor Miller’s call.73  It remains to be 
decided whether, armed, the Committee should engage in combat. 
 
73 See supra note 8. 
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APPENDIX 
ACTL/IAALS Pilot Project Rules74 
 
Rule Three: Precomplaint Discovery 
3.1 On motion by a proposed plaintiff with notice to the proposed 
defendant and opportunity to be heard, a proposed plaintiff may 
obtain precomplaint discovery upon the court’s determination, after 
hearing, that: 
 a. the moving party cannot prepare a legally sufficient 
complaint in the absence of the information sought by the 
discovery; 
  b. the moving party has probable cause to believe that the 
information sought by the discovery will enable preparation 
of a legally sufficient complaint; 
  c. the moving party has probable cause to believe that the 
information sought is in the possession of the person or entity 
from which it is sought; 
  d.  the proposed discovery is narrowly tailored to minimize 
expense and inconvenience; and 
  e. the moving party’s need for the discovery outweighs the 
burden and expense to other persons and entities. 
3.2 The court may grant a motion for precomplaint discovery 
directed to a nonparty pursuant to PPR 3.1.  Advance notice to the 
nonparty is not required, but the nonparty’s ability to file a motion to 
quash shall be preserved. 
3.3 If the court grants a motion for precomplaint discovery, the court 
may impose limitations and conditions, including provisions for the 
allocation of costs and attorneys’ fees, on the scope and other terms of 
discovery. 
 
 
74 IAALS, supra note 65, at 4. 
